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DEFINING THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT’S
“SUFFICIENTLY TRAINED” TRIBAL COURT JUDGE
Jill Elizabeth Tompkins
Modern tribal courts are faced with the difficult proposition of
resolving increasingly complex disputes in a manner that is both
loyal to tradition, and responsive to Anglo notions of due process.
Tribal courts . . . are in a unique position to rediscover tribal
customs and traditions as a manner of resolving disputes and
reintegrating those values into modern Indian life. The resolution
of a dispute in tribal court, however, must always be administered
with a dose of Anglo due process . . . .1
Honorable B.J. Jones
Chief Justice, Turtle Mountain Court of Appeals
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INTRODUCTION
Tribal justice systems are one of the most visible
manifestations of the exercise of tribal sovereignty. Diminution of
tribal court criminal jurisdiction by the U.S. Supreme Court is the
trend that has most undermined American Indian and Alaska
President, Board of Directors, National American Indian Court Judges
Association (NAICJA); Past Director and Clinical Professor of Law, University
of Colorado School of Law American Indian Law Clinic. Thank you to the
NAICJA Board of Directors and Steering Committee, especially the Honorable
Carrie Garrow, Mark Pouley, and Joseph Wiseman, for their invaluable insights
and support in the writing of this article. Special appreciation is given to
Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Court judicial law clerk Latanya Gabaldon for her
editorial assistance.
1
B.J. Jones, Welcoming Tribal Courts into the Judicial Fraternity: Emerging
Issues in Tribal-state and Tribal-federal Court Relations, 457 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 457, 475 (1998).
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Native tribes’ ability to protect their citizens and communities. In
1968, with the passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), 2
tribal courts were divested of authority to hand down felony
sentences, essentially stripping the tribes of meaningful jurisdiction
over serious offenders. With the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, tribal courts were deemed to lack
jurisdiction over non-Indians charged with committing criminal
offenses within tribal lands.3 Fortunately, in recent years, Congress
has been more attentive to the alarms raised by tribal leaders
regarding the rates and nature of the violent crimes occurring in
Indian Country by Indians and non-Indians alike, and has taken
action to restore a limited amount of tribal court jurisdiction and
sentencing authority.
The Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 (TLOA) is one example
of Congress’ response 4 . It amended the ICRA to allow tribal
courts to sentence offenders up to three years for any one offense
and up to nine years in any single proceeding. 5 However, this new
sentencing authority came with certain strings attached—
ostensibly put into place to ensure that defendants charged in tribal
court receive due process. With the enactment of the Violence
Against Women Act Reauthorization of 2013 (VAWA), Title IX,
“Safety For Indian Women,” 6 Congress took additional steps to
address violence in Indian County. These steps especially focused
on the epidemic of sexual and domestic violence committed by
non-Indians against American Indian women. VAWA 2013
restores to tribes the ability to prosecute non-Indians who commit
crimes of sexual and domestic violence in Indian Country. This
restored jurisdiction is referred to in VAWA 2013 as “Special
Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction” (SDVCJ). Pursuant to
VAWA 2013, for the first time since the Oliphant decision, tribes
will again be able to prosecute non-Indians, but for only three
categories of crime: domestic violence, dating violence, and
2

Indian Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 18 and 25 U.S.C.).
3
Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) (concluding that
Indian tribes do not have inherent jurisdiction to try and punish non-Indians).
4
Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2258.
5
25 U.S.C. §§ 1302 (a)(7)(B), (C), (D) (2010).
6
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. 113-4, §
1101(a), 127 Stat. 134 (2013).
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violations of protection orders. 7 Certain prerequisites must be
satisfied in order for the tribal court to exercise this jurisdiction: 1)
one of the parties in the case must be Indian; and 2) the defendant
must have sufficient ties to the Indian community through
residence, employment, or a relationship with a tribal member, or
Indian resident. 8 If tribes wish to exercise the expanded SDVCJ
however, the TLOA’s Due Process requirements attach. In order to
restore tribal criminal authority, Congress adopted a compromise
that would allay non-Indian concerns regarding the fairness of
tribal court proceedings balanced against the tribes’ competing
desire to preserve the cultural integrity of their justice systems.
This Article explores the meaning of ICRA’s new provisions
which require tribes choosing to exercise jurisdiction in criminal
matters with either TLOA’s enhanced sentencing authority or
VAWA’s SDVCJ to utilize judges that are “licensed by any
jurisdiction in the United States” 9 and have “sufficient legal
training to preside over criminal trials.” 10 Part I discusses the
historical criticism levied against tribal courts which gave rise to
the imposition of ICRA’s tribal judicial qualifications as a
jurisdictional prerequisite. Next, Part II explores the tension tribal
courts experience as they seek to operate systems committed to
traditional cultural values, which will be able to withstand federal
court scrutiny. Finally, Part III offers recommendations for tribes
to help them satisfy ICRA’s judicial qualification requirements.
Although Congress has mandated tribal judicial qualifications as a
precursor to the exercise of SDVCJ and the imposition of TLOA’s
enhanced sentencing authority, it allowed significant leeway for
tribal courts to develop their own approaches to satisfying the
requirements.
I. DUE PROCESS CONCERNS ABOUT TRIBAL COURTS
“Why Would Anyone Oppose the Violence Against Women
Act?” is the question Molly Ball, a reporter for The Atlantic, set
out to answer after 22 Republican senators voted against

7

Id.
Id.
9
25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)(3)(B).
10
Id. § 1302(c)(3)(A).
8
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reauthorizing VAWA in February 2013. 11 Among the reasons
these dissenters took such a “politically risky stand” was their
opposition to the provision that would give tribal governments
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit crimes on
reservations.12 These critics “say tribal courts are under resourced
and have a history of failing to provide legal protections to
defendants.”13
The chronic inadequacy of tribal court funding has been known
for decades.14 For example, in 1942, the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, while noting the phenomenal progress of tribal courts,
identified underfunding as a lingering problem: “[t]he lack of
adequate appropriations for the support of courts and for the
maintenance of an adequate police force have handicapped the
administration of justice.” 15 About a half-century later, the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights examined enforcement of the ICRA
starting in 1986 and issued its report in 1991. One of the
Commission’s key findings at that time was that “[t]he failure of
the United States Government to provide proper funding for the
operation of tribal judicial systems, particularly in light of the
imposed requirements of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, has
continued for more than 20 years.” 16 This is still the case, as
evidenced by the recent Government Accounting Office survey of
tribes. In 2012, the GAO conducted a survey of 171 tribes
regarding their plans to implement TLOA’s new sentencing
authority.17 109 of 171 tribes responded, and none of the 109 tribes
11

Molly Ball, Why Would Anyone Oppose the Violence Against Women Act?,
THE ATLANTIC, Feb. 12, 2013, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/02/why-would-anyoneoppose-the-violence-against-women-act/273103/.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Robyn Shapiro, Report to the House of Delegates, 117A A.B.A. SEC.
INDIVIDUAL RTS. AND RESPONSIBILITIES REP. 4,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/jd/tribalcourts/pdf/OneH
undredSeventeenA.authcheckdam.pdf.
15
U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT: A REPORT OF
THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 41 (1991) (citing JOHN
COLLIER, 1941 REPORT OF COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS).
16
Id. at 72.
17
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-658R,
TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER ACT: NONE OF THE SURVEYED TRIBES REPORTED
EXERCISING THE NEW SENTENCING AUTHORITY, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF
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were exercising TLOA’s enhanced sentencing authority at the
time.18 When asked to describe challenges to exercising the new
jurisdiction, 96 percent of the responding tribes cited lack of
funding as the most common barrier.19 Additionally, several tribes
reported specific challenges with the cost of hiring a licensed, lawtrained judge.20
Unfortunately, a national picture of tribal court funding
situations does not exist. Tribal justice systems can be funded
through the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs funds, Department of
Justice grants, and/or tribal sources, including proceeds from
Indian gaming and other tribal economic ventures. The
forthcoming Bureau of Justice Statistics 2014 National Tribal
Court Survey21 will hopefully go a long way to finally providing
information about tribal court funding trends and documenting
their unmet need. It is anticipated that the survey will reveal that
the root reason tribes are hesitant to exercise the expanded
sentencing authority under TLOA and the new SDVCJ jurisdiction
under VAWA is lack of funding for tribal court operations and
detention facilities.
Fierce criticism of tribal courts is not a recent phenomenon.
Often the critic will paint all tribal justice systems with the same
broad brush based on a single questionable ruling or practice of a
single tribal court. Tribal courts have been scrutinized by members
of Congress and by the federal courts. For example, in his dissent
in Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Red Wolf, Circuit Judge Kleinfeld
detailed at length the numerous due process defects he perceived in
a wrongful death jury trial conducted by the Crow Tribal Court.22
JUSTICE COULD CLARIFY TRIBAL ELIGIBILITY OF CERTAIN GRANT FUNDS 2
(2012), available at http://gao.gov/assets/600/591213.pdf.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 8.
20
Id.
21
Kauffman & Associates, Inc., 2014 National Tribal Court Survey of Tribal
Court Systems, http://www.tribalcourtsurvey.org/survey/.
22
Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Red Wolf, 106 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 1997),
(citing due process violations including the impaneling of a jury where a
majority of the jurors were related to the decedents, improper prejudicial
comments by a tribal appellate court judge to the jury venire prior to being
impanelled, the use of evidence that would have been barred under federal rules,
and the barring of evidence relating to the proper amount of compensatory
damages.), vacated Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Estate of Red Wolf, 522 U.S.
801 (1997).
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At about the same time, Congressman Henry Hyde, in 1996, spoke
on the floor of the House of Representatives repeating Judge
Kleinfeld’s Due Process complaints about the Crow trial
proceedings.23 His closing remarks foreshadowed the imposition of
the due process requirements mandated in TLOA and VAWA:
I do want to stress that I believe in the Indian tribal
court system. It is only right that Indians should be
able to have their own courts to judge their own
affairs. By the same token, I want to say
emphatically that it is only right that those courts
should provide all of the constitutional protections
required by law, including basic due process. The
consistent enforcement of constitutional norms is
particularly important if the tribal courts are to have
jurisdiction over nonmembers who have only
tangential relationships with the tribes.24
More recently, Senators Jon Kyl, Orrin Hatch, and Tom
Coburn wrote a “Minority View” report objecting to the provision
of VAWA 2013 that establishes tribal criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indian offenders. 25 Their criticism was only supported by
anecdotes regarding a few isolated tribal court systems.26 Among
their complaints was the criticism that tribal courts are “raciallyexclusive” 27 —without, of course, acknowledging that it was the
U.S. Supreme Court that created the situation with its Oliphant
decision.
In Oliphant, Chief Justice Rehnquist approvingly cites the
reasoning of Ex parte Crow Dog. 28 In Ex parte Crow Dog, the
Court confronted the issue of whether, prior to the passage of the
Major Crimes Act, federal courts had jurisdiction to try Indians
who had offended against fellow Indians on reservation land.29 In
concluding that criminal jurisdiction was exclusively in the tribe,
23

142 CONG. REC. E1704 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1996) (statement of Rep. Henry J.
Hyde), https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/1996/9/26/daily-digest.
24
Id.
25
S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 48–56 (2011).
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (citing Ex parte
Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883)).
29
Id. at 210.
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the Crow Dog court found “particular guidance in the ‘nature and
circumstances of the case.’”30
The United States was seeking to extend United
States “law, by argument and inference only, . . .
over aliens and strangers; over the members of a
community separated by race [and] tradition, . . .
from the authority and power which seeks to impose
upon them the restraints of an external and
unknown code . . . ; which judges them by a
standard made by others and not for them. . . . It
tries them not by their peers, nor by the customs of
their people, nor the law of their land, but by . . . a
different race, according to the law of a social state
of which they have an imperfect conception . . . .”31
Applying this reasoning to the inverse situation concerning a
non-Indian offender, the Oliphant court declined to adopt the
position that tribes retain the power to try non-Indians according to
their own customs and procedures. 32 Rather, the Court held that
tribes did not have inherent jurisdiction to try and punish nonIndian offenders.33
Senators Kyl, Hatch, and Coburn cite an Indian newspaper
publisher, who without documentary support, asserted that, “[i]n
most tribal constitutions there is no separation of powers.” 34
Professor Frank Pommersheim articulated the importance of
separation of powers for the legitimacy of tribal courts:
“majoritarian politics . . . cannot achieve legitimacy for all
segments of society or tribe. The legal system . . . ha[s] often been
able to establish the rights of individuals or groups to be treated
fairly under the law.” 35 In order for a tribal court to protect the
rights of individuals it needs to be able to operate without political
interference from other tribal governmental branches. What these
critics fail to acknowledge, however, is that with the passage of the
30

Id.
Id. at 210–11.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 212.
34
S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 49 (2011).
35
FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND
CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE 72–73 (1995).
31
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Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 36 tribes were encouraged to
adopt cookie-cutter constitutions that did not provide for
independent tribal judiciaries. A review of more recently adopted
or revised tribal constitutions, however, reveals an emerging trend
towards the establishment of constitutionally separate tribal
courts.37
Although VAWA 2013’s tribal court jurisdictional provisions
are directed solely to criminal prosecutions, these opposing
Senators took the opportunity to rail against the principle of tribal
sovereign immunity and leaped to the following conclusion: “[t]his
lack of civil-rights guarantees and avenues for their meaningful
enforcement has resulted in tribal criminal-justice systems that fail
to provide Due Process.”38 Finally, they proffered a solution to the
lack of prosecution of non-Indian offenders on Indian reservations:
[A]n obvious solution to the problem of gaps in
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians on
reservations in cases where the United States
declines to prosecute an offense committed on a
reservation by a non-Indian, [is that] state
authorities should be allowed to do so, regardless of
the race of the victim . . . . [T]he notion of sovereign
“tribal territory” that is immune from the reach of
state law is more legal fiction than government
reality . . . . There is no good reason to not give
states and their local governments jurisdiction to
prosecute offenses committed by non-Indians
within Indian reservations.39
These Senators are unaware that their idea is far from novel.
Public Law 280 (PL 280), passed during the “Termination Era”—
36

25 U.S.C.A §§ 461–494 (west 2015).
JOSEPH THOMAS FLIES-AWAY, CARRIE GARROW, & MIRIAM JORGENSEN,
NATIVE NATION COURTS: KEY PLAYERS IN NATION REBUILDING, IN REBUILDING
NATIVE NATIONS, STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 377–78
(2nd ed. 2010) (“If the nation does not have a constitutional separation of
powers or a set of institutions or processes that promote independent dispute
resolution outside of the written constitution, it probably ought to pursue judicial
independence through constitutional reform . . . . In the past few years, more
tribal nations are engaging in constitutional reform activities, which often
include discussion and popular vote on separation of powers.”).
38
Id. at 50.
39
Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
37
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between 1953 and 1968—, extended state criminal jurisdiction to
Indian County in several states.40 Steven Pevar, author and Senior
Staff Counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union, offers that
one major reason for the high rate of crime in Indian Country is
that many of the officials responsible for prosecuting reservation
crime—federal officials in non-PL 280 states and state officials in
PL 280 states—“have largely abdicated those responsibilities. In
PL 280 states, the counties in which Indian reservations are located
are often reluctant to spend their limited tax dollars on fighting
reservation crime.”41 Consequently, the extension of state criminal
jurisdiction to offenses committed by non-Indians within Indian
reservations, via a PL 280 type fix, not only flies in the face of the
principle of tribal sovereignty, but has already proven to be
dangerously ineffective.
Certainly, there are some tribal courts that have employed
methods that do not comport with general American notions of
Due Process. A wider review of tribal court systems, however,
reveals a major following of tribal constitutions and laws that
incorporate at a minimum the requirements of the ICRA. 42
Moreover, many tribes have adopted constitutions that guarantee
most, if not all, of the protections enjoyed under the U.S.
Constitution. 43 Regardless of the current state of tribal
constitutions, tribes that wish to exercise the expanded jurisdiction
under TLOA and VAWA, must, nonetheless, satisfy the new
requirements of Due Process as articulated in those statutes.
II. THE TRIBAL JUDGE REQUIREMENTS
When a tribe seeks to exercise the expanded jurisdiction and
enhanced sentencing authority of TLOA or VAWA 2013’s
SDVCJ, and the defendant is subject to the possibility of
imprisonment, the tribe must provide the following enumerated
Due Process protections: 1) effective assistance of counsel equal to
40

Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended in scatted sections of
18 U.S.C. and 25 U.S.C §1360).
41
STEPHEN PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 131 (4th ed. 2012).
42
See Barbara Ann Atwood, Tribal Jurisprudence and Cultural Meaning of
Family, 79 NEB. L. REV. 557 (2000).
43
Id. at 590 (“[C]ertain tribes [have] adopted a separation of powers ideology,
either de jure or de facto, and their courts have exercised the power of judicial
review.”).
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at least that guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution; 2) in the case of a
indigent defendant, a defense attorney licensed to practice by any
jurisdiction in the United States, provided, at the tribal
government’s expense; 3) an assurance that the defense attorney is
licensed by a jurisdiction that applies appropriate licensing
standards and effectively ensures the competence and professional
responsibility of its licensed attorneys; 4) that judges presiding
over criminal proceedings subject to enhanced sentencing or
concerning a non-Indian defendant have “sufficient legal training
to preside over criminal trials;” and 5) that any judge presiding
over criminal proceedings subject to enhanced sentencing or
concerning a non-Indian defendant is licensed to practice law by
any jurisdiction in the United States.44
In contrast to these Congressional efforts to “Westernize” tribal
courts, in the last twenty-years or so, many American Indian and
Alaska Native tribes have begun questioning and reevaluating their
existing tribal courts. Tribal courts are seen as the product of
“historical suppression,”45—ill-fitting and ineffective at addressing
individual and community problems—and many tribes are
reclaiming their traditional dispute resolution practices. Many
tribes are deliberately including the use of tribal elders,
peacemakers, and lay judges in their justice systems. These are the
individuals who have deep knowledge of indigenous justice
principles and are usually highly respected by the tribal
community. While seeking to implement indigenous approaches,
grounded in cultural values, traditions and custom, tribal courts are
grappling with an increasing number of complex cases involving a
multiplication of social woes and dangers. Additionally, tribal
courts need to be cognizant that their decisions will be scrutinized
and judged by outside jurisdictions and face the prospects of not
being enforced, especially if those decisions do not comport with
federal notions of Due Process.
Professor of Law and Chief Justice of the Turtle Mountain
Court of Appeals B.J. Jones described the reconciliation process
that is happening in tribal justice systems:

44
45

25 U.S.C. §§ 1302(c), 1304(d).
Jones, supra note 1, at 475.
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Modern tribal courts are faced with the difficult
proposition of resolving increasingly complex
disputes in a manner that is both loyal to tradition,
and responsive to Anglo notions of due process.
Tribal courts . . . are in a unique position to
rediscover tribal customs and traditions as a manner
of resolving disputes and reintegrating those values
into modern Indian life. The resolution of a dispute
in tribal court, however, must always be
administered with a dose of Anglo due process
because of the need to have tribal judgments
respected by outside court systems.46
Since its enactment in 1968, ICRA has provided a means for a
detained criminal defendant to seek a writ of habeas corpus from a
federal district court for alleged ICRA violations.47 A very small
percentage of all tribal criminal court cases are challenged in
federal court under ICRA.48 In 2013, Professor and Judge Carrie
Garrow conducted an unprecedented survey of habeas corpus
petitions filed in federal court under ICRA since 1968.49 Over the
course of forty-five years, only thirty cases were filed.50 When the
detainee is an Indian, the federal courts have been respectful of
tribal sovereignty and tribal court jurisdiction. 51 Fifteen of the
thirty petitions were dismissed for failure to exhaust tribal court
remedies. 52 However, when a tribal government detains a non46

Id.
25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2015) (“The writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any
person, in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by
order of an Indian tribe.”).
48
Carrie E. Garrow, Habeas Corpus Petitions In Federal And Tribal Courts: A
Search For Individualized Justice, 24 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 137 (Oct.
2015). Carrie Garrow is a Visiting Assistant Professor at Syracuse University
and the Chief Appellate Judge for the St. Regis Mohawk Tribal Court.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 9.
51
Id.
52
Id.; accord Alvarez v. Tracy, 773 F.3d 1011, 1021 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Requiring
exhaustion of tribal remedies not only fosters mutual respect between sovereigns
in a manner similar to abstention in favor of state courts . . . but also promotes
tribal self-government through the development of the tribal court system . . . .
.Thus the tribal exhaustion doctrine implicates unique and ‘exceptional’
concerns beyond those implicated in federal-state comity cases . . . . Not only
does adjudicating ICRA claims in federal court necessarily constitute an
interference with tribal autonomy and self-government . . . but resolution of
statutory issues under ICRA will ‘frequently depend on questions of tribal
47
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Indian, the federal courts have found that exhaustion of tribal
remedies is not required.53 Five of the thirty cases involved nonIndian defendants.54 As a result of the Oliphant decision, it is rare
for non-Indians to be detained by tribal governments. Of the thirty
habeas corpus cases reviewed by Professor Garrow, only four
writs were granted.55
Congress has not articulated a standard of review for federal
courts assessing tribal court convictions for alleged violations of
ICRA in habeas corpus proceedings.56 In a recent article presented
to the California Tribal-State Judicial Forum, Judge Joseph J.
Wiseman57 and attorney Jacquelyn Larson explored what standard
of review federal courts should employ.58 Since ICRA’s enactment
in 1968, federal courts have adopted a de novo standard of review
and have applied federal constitutional case law in their analysis.59
When a federal court reviews a state court decision in the
habeas context, the highly deferential standard of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) is applied.60
Under this standard of review, federal review of a state court
decision “shall not” be granted unless the state court’s factual
determination was “unreasonable” or if the state proceedings
resulted in a decision that involved an “unreasonable” application
of “clearly established” federal law as determined by the Supreme
tradition and custom which tribal forums may be in a better position to evaluate
than federal courts.”).
53
Garrow, supra note 51, at 9.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
See 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2015).
57
Chief Judge, Northern California Intertribal Court; Chief Justice, Court of
Appeals, Round Valley Indian Tribes.
58
Joseph J. Wiseman, There and Back Again (Almost), A.B.A, Aug. 12, 2013,
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/civil/articles/081213-thereback-again-indian-country-almost.html.
59
Miranda v. Anchondo, 684 F.3d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The construction
or interpretation of a statute [such as ICRA] is a question of law . . . reviewed de
novo.”); see also Quair v. Sisco, 359 F. Supp. 2d 948, 977–79 (E.D. Cal. 2004)
(construing allegations of violations of ICRA utilizing a de novo standard with
no legal support except for one U.S. Supreme Court case); United States v.
Becerra-Garcia, 397 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2005) (non-habeas proceeding
finding that ICRA imposes an “identical limitation” on tribal government action
as the Fourth Amendment and utilizing predominantly Ninth Circuit precedent
reasoning that the federal standard “nets the same result as an analysis under
ICRA”).
60
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1996).
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Court.61 Wiseman and Larson concur with Garrow’s finding that
the vast majority of habeas petitions for alleged violations of
ICRA are dismissed because the petitioner has not exhausted all
tribal remedies. 62 Habeas review is repeatedly denied by federal
courts because the “policy of nurturing tribal self-government
strongly discourages federal courts from assuming jurisdiction
over unexhausted claims.”63 Wiseman and Larson posit:
Yet, despite this policy [of nurturing tribal selfgovernment] once a tribe has exhausted its power,
the tribe’s definitions of such important ideals as
due process and equal protection will be enforced
identically to the definitions already in place by the
federal court circuit encompassing that tribe. If,
instead, Congress put in a deferential standard
similar to the AEDPA, setting Supreme Court cases
as the base standard, this would allow a tribe the
ability to define its own rules without putting in
place lower level federal definitions, and would
actually encourage tribal self-government.64
As tribal courts begin to exercise jurisdiction under 25 U.S.C. §
1302(c) and § 1304, where tribal court defendants are being
provided with the services of licensed defense attorneys, it is
highly likely that the number of petitions for writs of habeas
corpus filed in federal court will increase significantly in the near
future. For this reason, tribal court judges must be even more
cognizant of the increased likelihood of outside federal review of
their criminal proceedings.
A. The Licensed Tribal Judge
Let’s take a closer look at the requirements TLOA and VAWA
2013 mandate for tribal judges who are responsible for exercising
the enhanced sentencing authority. These judicial qualification
requirements are found in each law under the heading “Rights of

61

Wiseman, supra note 63 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1996)).
Id. (citing Jeffredo v. Macarro, 599 F.3d 913, 918 (9th Cir. 2010); Alvarez v.
Tracey 773 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2014)).
63
Jeffredo, 599 F.3d.
64
Wiseman, supra note 63, at 5.
62
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Defendants.”65 The presiding tribal court judge must be licensed to
practice law and have “sufficient legal training to preside over
criminal proceedings.” 66 In the course of the Government
Accounting Office 2012 study on the implementation of TLOA,
one tribe reported that it maintained a very effective civil and
criminal justice system for the past forty years in spite of never
having or requiring a law-trained judge to preside over the court.67
When considering the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2009, the
Committee on Indian Affairs received comments that tribal court
judges should be required to graduate from an accredited law
school and be licensed by a state supreme court. 68 Noting that
several states do not require judges to graduate from an accredited
law school, the Committee declined to recommend such
qualifications.69 The Committee did provide some guidance as to
the licensing requirements:
The intent of the section 304 licensing requirements
for public defenders and tribal court judges respects
the dual purposes of the Indian Civil Rights Act to
protect the rights of individuals before tribal courts,
and to acknowledge and strengthen tribal selfgovernment.
Section
304
requires
tribal
governments that enact criminal laws subjecting
offenders to more than one year imprisonment for
any one offense to also require attorneys and judges
presiding over such criminal trials to meet certain
licensing standards. Whether the standard employed
is a state, federal or tribal standard will be a
decision for the tribal government. Several tribal
governments have developed their own tribal law
standards and others have adopted state licensing
standards.70
As a result of the Committee’s guidance, Congress mandated
that the presiding tribal court judge be “licensed to practice by any
65

25 U.S.C. §§ 1302(c), 1304(d).
25 U.S.C. §§ 1302(c)(3), 1304(d)(1).
67
U.S. GOV’T Accounting Office, supra note 18, at 8.
68
S. REP. NO. 111-93, at 17 n.57 (2009).
69
Id.
70
Id.
66
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jurisdiction in the United States.”71 Given the Senate Committee
report’s language it is fairly clear that so long as the tribal judge
meets the tribe’s licensing standard then one of the qualification
prongs is met.72
B. The Sufficiently Trained Judge
The requirement that the tribal court judge have “sufficient
legal training to preside over criminal proceedings”73 is much more
ambiguous. One scholar has astutely noted that:
[S]uch an undefined standard subjects tribal judges
to having their qualifications scrutinized by federal
district court judges in habeas proceedings. Federal
judges will often be unfamiliar with the culturally
specific-values informing the tribal government’s
choice to use elders or lay judges. And as
professional lawyers trained in the modern
American system, federal judges may recoil from
the idea that nonlawyers could justly adjudicate
criminal cases. Thus in striving for flexibility,
Congress may have inadvertently opened the door
to inflexible federal court interpretations.74
The SDVCJ became effective for all tribes on March 7, 2015—
a whole two years after VAWA 2013’s enactment. Congress did
however establish a Pilot Project under which certain tribes could
apply to exercise SDVCJ prior to the effective date. 75 The
Department of Justice undertook widespread tribal consultation
that included opportunities for tribal judges to weigh in on how the
71

25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)(3)(B) (2010).
Cf. Johnson v. Tracy, No. CV-11001979-PHX-DGC, 2012 WL 4478801 (D.
Ariz. Sept. 28, 2012) (remanding for a new trial that comports with the
requirements of TLOA, where the original presiding judge was not licensed to
practice law by any jurisdiction of the United States).
73
25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)(3)(A) (2010).
74
Seth Fortin, Comment, The Two-Tiered Program of the Tribal Law and Order
Act, 61 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 88, 106 (2013).
75
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. 113-4, §
1101(a), 127 Stat. 134 (2013). In Section 908(a)(2): “[T]he Attorney General
may grant a request under subparagraph (A) after coordinating with the
Secretary of the Interior, consulting with affected Indian tribes, and concluding
that the criminal justice system of the requesting tribe has adequate safeguards
in place to protect defendants’ rights . . . .” Id.
72
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Department should evaluate a tribe’s eligibility to participate in the
Pilot Project. In May 2013, the Justice Department circulated a
“framing paper” seeking input on a variety of questions. 76 One
question posed was:
In criminal proceedings in which the tribe exercises
SDVCJ and a term of imprisonment of any length is
or may be imposed, the new statute requires that the
judge presiding over the criminal proceeding both is
licensed to practice law and has sufficient legal
training to preside over criminal proceedings. How
should the Justice Department evaluate whether a
judge’s legal training is sufficient to preside over
criminal proceedings?
The National American Indian Court Judges Association gave the
following response:
This is a difficult standard to articulate. No such
evaluation is necessary for many county and state
court judges—some of whom may not be law
school graduates or attorneys. . . . [I]n state courts
of general jurisdiction, a judge whose law practice
prior to taking the bench focused on non-criminal
matters, will be expected to expeditiously undertake
self-study to become competent to hear criminal
matters. . . . A certification by a nationally respected
tribal judicial education organization awarded to a
tribal judge after completing a course of classroom
and experiential study, could be developed that
could serve as prima facia [sic] evidence of
sufficient legal training. In lieu of that, the
Department should use a flexible tribal selfcertification approach in which the tribe articulates
what legal education and experience the judge who

76

OFFICE OF TRIBAL JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, APPLICATION
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE VAWA PILOT PROJECT ON TRIBAL CRIMINAL
JURISDICTION ( 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/tribal/legacy/2014/02/06/applquestionnaire-vawa-pilot.pdf.
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The Department of Justice granted the requests of three tribes
to exercise SDVCJ: the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian
Reservation in Oregon, the Pascua Yaqui Tribe of Arizona, and the
Tulalip Tribes of Washington.78 It may be instructive to see how
each of the successful applicant tribes answered the Department’s
question as to how the tribe would safeguard a defendant’s right to
a trained, licensed judge.79 If the Department of Justice found the
applicants’ judges qualified, then that assessment may give some
guidance to non-Pilot Project tribes.
To support their assertion of qualified judges, the Umatilla
Tribes cited: the Umatilla Criminal Code section 3.28(D), which
mirrors the language of 25 U.S.C. § 1303(c)(3); the Umatilla Court
Code section 2.02(D) which requires, “[a]ny judge presiding over a
criminal trial [to] be a member in good standing of any state bar
and a graduate of an accredited law school”; and Chapter 4 of the
Court Code, which sets out rules of judicial conduct “similar to
those governing state and federal judges.”80 The Umatilla’s current
judges, William Johnson and David Gallaher (pro tempore) are
both law school graduates, members of the Oregon bar, and have

77

Letter from Justice Jill E. Tompkins, President, Bd. of Directors, Nat’l Am.
Indian Court Judges Ass’n to Deputy Att’y Gen. Sam Hirsch, Re: Consultation
on Pilot Project, VAWA §§ 904 & 908 (May 23, 2013),
http://www.google.com/url?q=http://www.tribalinstitute.org/download/Drug%2520Court/NAICJA%2520comments%2520re%2
520Pilot%2520Project.docx&sa=U&ved=0ahUKEwiE8OiwrN_JAhVK2MKHYzcDVIQFggFMAA&client=internal-udscse&usg=AFQjCNHLjwoL2nnRGgwDCxseYf0yr-OR8g.
78
Three Tribes to Exercise Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Perpetrators Under
VAWA, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Feb. 6, 2014),
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2014/02/06/three-tribes-exercisejurisdiction-over-non-indian-perpetrators-under-vawa-153444.
79
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VAWA 2013 PILOT PROJECT,
HTTP://WWW.JUSTICE.GOV/TRIBAL/VAWA-2013-PILOT-PROJECT.
80
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, APPLICATION OF THE CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE
UMATILLA INDIAN RESERVATION FOR PERMISSION TO EXERCISE SDVCJ
AUTHORITY PRIOR TO MARCH OF 2015, 5 (Dec. 6, 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/tribal/legacy/2014/02/06/applquestionnaire-vawa.pdf.
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years of experience either adjudicating or prosecuting criminal
cases in tribal or state court.81
Like the Umatilla Tribes, the Pascua Yaqui Tribe answered the
question regarding the provision of a licensed, law trained judge by
reference to 3 PYTC section 2-2-313 which also mirrors the
language of 25 U.S.C. § 1303(c)(3).82 The only tribal judge listed
by the Pascua Yaqui Tribe in its application was Judge Mel Stoof,
who is admitted to practice in the State of Texas, several U.S.
District Courts, the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, and several tribal
courts in the Southwest United States.83
The Tulalip Tribes have taken a particularly thoughtful
approach to preparing themselves to undertake the jurisdiction
established under TLOA and VAWA 2013. Tulalip Tribal Code
Chapter 2.05 Tribal Court, section 2.05.040 sets forth the
qualifications of Tulalip tribal court judges generally:
(1) Eligibility. To be eligible to serve as a Judge of
the Tribal Court, a person must:
(a) Be over 25 years of age;
(b) Never have been convicted or found guilty
of a felony in any Federal or State Court or of a
Class E offense under Tulalip Tribal law;
(c) Within the previous five years, not have
been convicted of a misdemeanor in any Tribal,
Federal, or State Court;
(d) Be of high moral character and never have
been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude;
(e) Be either a Judge from any Federally
recognized Indian tribe, licensed to practice
before the Washington State Bar Association, or
any other qualified person appointed by the
81

Id.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, APPLICATION OF THE PASCUA YAQUI TRIBE VAWA
PILOT PROJECT QUESTIONNAIRE ON TRIBAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION, (Dec. 30,
2013), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/tribal/legacy/2014/02/06/applquestionnaire-pascua-yaqui.pdf.
83
Id.
82
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Tribal Board of Directors, or possess a J.D.
from an accredited law school; and
(f) Be a member in good standing of the Tulalip
Bar.84
Section 6 of the Tulalip Code explicitly sets forth the
qualifications of Tulalip judges who are authorized to preside over
felony crimes: “To be eligible to preside over all stages of a felony
criminal case, the Judge must: (a) have sufficient legal training to
preside over criminal proceedings; and (b) be licensed as an
attorney in the State of Washington or other state.”85 In support of
its assertion that the Tulalip Tribes has in place judges meeting the
qualifications of Section 6 and 25 U.S.C. § 1303(c)(3), the Tulalip
Tribes provided a link to a page on the tribal website where the
biography of the current tribal court judge, Chief Judge Ronald J.
Whitener, is posted.86In addition, the Tulalip Tribes included with
their application a copy of the Tulalip Tribes Domestic Violence
Court Rules. Rule 6.41(H)(ix) establishes the procedure by which
judges who are found to meet the qualifications to preside in the
Special Domestic Violence Court are chosen: “The Chief Judge
shall designate and assign Judges to the Special Domestic Violence
Court every January by standing order and the standing order and
qualifications of the Judge will become part of the trial record.”
Although all three applicant tribes statutorily mandate that the
tribal judges presiding over criminal cases possess TLOA and
SDVCJ’s judicial requirements, they did not elaborate on what
“sufficient legal training” the current judges underwent to preside
over criminal proceedings. It is doubtful that a reviewing federal
court in a habeas proceeding would be satisfied with such a
cursory demonstration of the training undertaken to preside over
criminal court proceedings. Thus, it is imperative that tribal court
84

TULALIP TRIBAL CODES § 2.05.040 (2015),
http://www.codepublishing.com/WA/Tulalip/html/Tulalip02/Tulalip0205.html#
2.05.040.
85
Id. § 2.05.040(6).
86
Chief Judge Ronald J. Whitener,TULALIP TRIBAL COURT,
http://www.tulaliptribesnsn.gov/Home/Government/Departments/TribalCourt/JudgesDirectorBio.aspx.
(last visited Dec. 31, 2015).
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criminal judges make specific findings in court record with regard
to both their licensure and their training.
It may be helpful to look at another situation in which the
qualifications of a legal professional, over and above licensure and
bar admission, are scrutinized. In order to serve as counsel in a
class action, an attorney must file a motion for appointment under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g). In appointing class counsel,
the court:
(A) must consider:
(i) the work counsel has done in identifying or
investigating potential claims in the action;
(ii) counsel's experience in handling class
actions, other complex litigation, and the types
of claims asserted in the action;
(iii) counsel's knowledge of the applicable law;
and
(iv) the resources that counsel will commit to
representing the class;
(B) may consider any other matter pertinent to
counsel's ability to fairly and adequately represent
the interests of the class . . . .87
There is no requirement that potential class counsel
demonstrate that he or she has undergone specific legal training in
the handling of class actions. Rather, the movant’s actual
experience in handling class actions and knowledge of the
governing law is the relevant consideration. In similar fashion,
when seeking to demonstrate that a tribal court judge has sufficient
training, providing a record of the number of prior criminal matters
that the judge has handled may be critical to overcome a habeas
challenge to a tribal court conviction based upon an inadequately
trained judge.
The U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary in its report,
which became VAWA 2013, explained that section 904,
87

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g).
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acknowledging inherent power of tribes to exercise SDVCJ,
“builds on the groundwork laid by Congress in passing the Tribal
Law and Order Act. [TLOA] is based on the premise that tribal
nations with sufficient resources and authority will be best able to
address violence in their own communities . . . .”88 The exercise of
jurisdiction costs money. It’s notable that all three Pilot Project
tribes operate casino resorts, and thus have access to financial
resources that many other tribes lack, which facilitated their ability
to fund the exercise of VAWA’s SDVCJ.89
How would a criminal defendant raise the issue that the
presiding tribal court judge is unqualified? Most complaints about
the qualifications and skill of a judge in state courts are handled
through the disciplinary or political processes. An unhappy litigant
may appeal a ruling but the arguments made on appeal are that the
judge either misinterpreted or misapplied the law. The complaints
are not directed personally to the judge’s qualifications to preside
over the trial itself. How would a criminal defendant in tribal court
raise the issue of the tribal judge’s lack of qualifications,
particularly the lack of sufficient training? A common way to
remove a judge is to move for the judge’s removal on
disqualification grounds. Canon 2 of the American Bar
Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct (“Model Rule”)
states that, “[a] judge shall perform the duties of judicial office,
impartially, competently, and diligently.” 90 Model Rule 2.5(A)
reiterates, “[a] judge shall perform judicial and administrative
duties, competently and diligently.” 91 Model Rule 2.11 which
relates to “disqualification” provides, in relevant part: “A judge
shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the
judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned . . . .”92 If the
judge does not recuse himself or herself on his or her own, one of
the parties may file a motion to disqualify the judge and have the

88

SEN. REP. NO. 112-153, at 9 (2012).
Gaming Compacts, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS,
http://www.indianaffairs.gov/WhoWeAre/AS-IA/OIG/Compacts/index.htm (last
visited Dec. 23, 2015).
90
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (2011).
91
Id. at 2.5(A) (emphasis added).
92
Id. at 2.11.
89
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motion and/or the case transferred to a disinterested judge.93 The
disqualification provisions of Model Rule 2.11 focus on challenges
to the judge’s impartiality. Although the Model Rules require a
judge to perform competently, they do not seem to contemplate
motions to disqualify based on incompetence, lack of training, or
lack of experience. Nonetheless, a motion to recuse is one way in
which a defendant may challenge the tribal court judge’s
qualifications to hear the case.94
Another possible way to challenge a presiding tribal court
judge’s qualifications in a criminal case is by a motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 95 Under 25 U.S.C. §
1302(b), if the defendant is subject to being imprisoned for a total
term of more than one year, the tribe is required to utilize a
licensed judge with sufficient training to preside over criminal
proceedings.96 In such a case, a defendant may argue that the judge
lacked sufficient training, and, therefore, a key element of subjectmatter jurisdiction was lacking. Or, in the alternative, that the
“unqualified” judge can still hear the case, but simply cannot
impose a sentence in excess of one year.
The argument that the lack of a qualified presiding judge
divests the court of subject matter jurisdiction may be made with
greater force in cases that fall under ICRA’s provisions governing
the exercise of SDVCJ. Section 1304(d) states that in a criminal
proceeding in which a participating tribe exercises special
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction, the participating tribe shall
provide, inter alia, “all applicable rights under the Act”; which
includes the right to a presiding judge who meets the qualifications
under 25 U.S.C § 1302(c)(3). Thus it can be argued that a licensed,
trained tribal court judge is a prerequisite to the exercise of
SDVCJ.
93

Leslie Abramson, Deciding Recusal Motions: Who Judges the Judges?, 28
VAL. U. L. REV. 543, 545 (1994).
94
Cf. Johnson v. Tracy, No. CV-11001979-PHX-DGC, 2012 WL 4478801, at
*3 (D. Ariz Sept. 28, 2012). One of the grounds for the tribal court defendant’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus is that he was denied the procedural
protections of 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c). Id. In granting the petition, the federal
district court did note that the judge at the trial was not licensed to practice law.
Id. The order does not reveal whether or how the defendant raised the judge’s
lack of qualifications at the trial level. Id.
95
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).
96
25 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (2010).
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III. STEPS FOR SATISFYING ICRA’S TRIBAL JUDICIAL
REQUIREMENTS
There are number of steps that tribes and tribal courts can take
to ensure that the judges presiding over criminal proceedings meet
the requirements of 25 U.S.C. § 1302(b) and 1304(d). First, action
should be taken by the tribal legislature and the government
agency with budgeting authority. Tribal code provisions should
require that the only persons eligible to be a tribal court judge in
criminal cases governed by TLOA and SDVCJ must be licensed
and trained. Sufficient federal funding should be provided to the
tribal court to secure licensed judges and ensure that they receive
training in criminal law and procedure.97 If a tribe has the means to
do so, tribal judicial training should be high on the list of priorities
for allocation of tribal funds. Second, the tribal court itself could
establish by court rule that only judges who are licensed and
trained may be assigned to hear TLOA and SDVCJ matters. In a
manner similar to the Tulalip Tribal Court, a separate court docket
could be established in which the federally mandated Due Process
protections are provided. 98 Each presiding judge should have a
continually updated resume or biographical statement that recites
the judge’s educational background, licensure, formal criminal
training (including law school classes and other trainings through
the National Judicial College or other judicial educational
organizations), and the number of criminal trials and/or appeals
adjudicated.

97

In 1998, Attorney General Janet Reno stated in testimony before the Senate
Indian Affairs Committee, that it is “crucial” to provide additional funding to
“better enable Indian tribal courts, historically under-funded and under-staffed,
to meet the demands of burgeoning case loads.” Attorney General Reno
acknowledged that, “With adequate resources and training, [tribal courts] are
most capable of crime prevention and peacekeeping.” It is her view that
“fulfilling the federal government’s trust responsibility to Indian nations means
not only adequate federal law enforcement in Indian Country, but enhancement
of tribal justice systems as well.” See Department of Justice/Department of the
Interior Tribal Justice Initiatives: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian
Affairs, 105th Cong. 55 (1998) (statement of Janet Reno, Att‘y Gen. of the
United States).
98
TULALIP TRIBAL CODES § 4.25.040 (2015),
http://www.codepublishing.com/wa/Tulalip/?Tulalip04/Tulalip0425.html#4.25.0
40.
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Third, procedures should be put in place so that the trial record
reflects the defendant’s right to have the case heard by a licensed
and trained judge. The advisement of rights at arraignment should
articulate both orally and in writing the due process protections
required by TLOA and VAWA. As part of the advisement, the
presiding judge should recite his or her qualifications. 99 The
defendant should also be provided with a copy of the judge’s
resume or biographical paragraph. If feasible, the tribal prosecutor
should try to reach a stipulation with defense counsel that the
presiding judge is licensed and qualified. Bench rulings and written
judgments of conviction should include a finding that reiterates
that the presiding judge is licensed and sufficiently trained in the
conduct of criminal proceedings.
Although Congress declined to require that tribal court judges
exercising the expanded jurisdiction under TLOA and VAWA
2013 be law school graduates, it did express the understanding that
“tribal court judges presiding over the case must be licensed and
law trained.” 100 In 1968, ICRA were enacted because the U.S.
Constitution does not govern tribes, and thus neither tribes nor
tribal justice systems are required to follow the Bill of Rights.101
Ironically, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 is titled “Constitutional Rights of
Indians.” After the amendments effectuated by TLOA and VAWA
2013, ICRA now includes language that tribes must provide
criminal defendants with protections “equal to that guaranteed by
the United States Constitution” 102 and “all other rights whose
protection is necessary under the Constitution of the United
States.”103 Consequently, the conclusion can be drawn that tribal
judges presiding over matters governed by TLOA and VAWA
99

In many tribal cultures humility is an aspirational virtue. A judicial recitation
of accomplishments may be perceived as bragging and might be uncomfortable.
100
S. REP. NO. 111-93, at 24 (2009) (emphasis added).
101
See Santa Clara v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) (“As separate sovereigns
preexisting the Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as
unconstrained by those constitutional provisions framed specifically as
limitations on federal or state authority . . . this Court [has] held that the Fifth
Amendment d[oes] not ‘operat[e] upon’ ‘the powers of local self-government
enjoyed’ by the tribes. In ensuing years, the lower federal courts have extended
the holding of Talton to other provisions of the Bill of Rights, as well as to the
Fourteenth Amendment.”).
102
25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)(1) (2010).
103
25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(4) (2010).
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2013 must be trained in the Due Process protections as conferred
under the U.S. Constitution and construed in case law.
There are almost no formal qualifications for federal judges.104
The U.S. Constitution does not even mandate that Justices of the
Supreme Court be law school graduates.105 Nonetheless, there is an
informal requirement that both federal and state judges be law
school graduates. 106 Federal judges who are hearing habeas
petitions from tribal court detention orders will be looking through
the lens of a law school graduate and may conclude that a tribal
judge who has not attended an ABA accredited law school is not
“sufficiently trained.” Does this mean that all state and federal
judges who are law school graduates are fully equipped by their
educations to preside over criminal proceedings? The American
Bar Association’s Revised Standards for Accreditation of Law
Schools (“Standards”) does not require accredited law schools to
follow a particular curriculum. 107 Rather the Standards provide
general direction including what the objectives of a program of
legal education must be: “A law school shall maintain a rigorous
program of legal education that prepares its students, upon
graduation, for admission to the bar and for effective, ethical, and

104

Magistrate and bankruptcy judges are required by statute to be lawyers, but
there is no such requirement for district judges, circuit judges, or Supreme Court
justices. 28 U.S.C. § 361(b)(1) provides that, “[n]o individual may be appointed
or reappointed to serve as a magistrate judge under this chapter unless: (1) He
has been for at least five years a member in good standing of the bar of the
highest court of a State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, the Territory of Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands, or the Virgin Islands of the United States, except that an individual who
does not meet the bar membership requirements of this paragraph may be
appointed and serve as a part-time magistrate judge if the appointing court or
courts and the conference find that no qualified individual who is a member of
the bar is available to serve at a specific location.”
105
U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 1 (sole constitutional requirement for federal judges and
justices to hold office is “good Behaviour”).
106
Only forty-seven (47) of 112 U.S. Supreme Court Justices have had no
formal law school training. See, HENRY JULIAN ABRAHAM, JUSTICES,
PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II 49 (5th ed. 2007).
107
Revised Standards for Approval of Law Schools, A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC.
AND ADMISSIONS (August 2014), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_an
d_admissions_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_resolutions/201406_revised_stan
dards_clean_copy.authcheckdam.pdf.
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responsible participation as members of the legal profession.” 108
Most law schools, however, have their own mandatory curriculum
for the first year. An ABA study of law school curricula
documented that 86.9 percent of accredited law schools required
full-time students to take a course in Criminal Law in their first
year. 109 Only 11 percent required first year students to take a
Criminal Procedure course.110
In state and federal systems, many judges hearing criminal
cases may have only had one formal criminal law course. Despite
this lack of formal training, experienced criminal law attorneys are
frequently appointed to the bench. It would be advisable that nonlaw school graduate tribal court judges designated to preside in
criminal proceedings governed by 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c) and/or §
1304 undergo criminal law training equivalent to at least what a
first year law student receives. It is important, however, for the
tribal judge to also keep a record of his or her criminal law
experience as an advocate, attorney, or judge. This on-the-job
training can be used to support a finding that the presiding judge
has sufficient legal training. Given that under SDVCJ, tribal judges
will be hearing prosecutions involving allegations that the
defendant committed domestic violence, dating violence, or
violated a protection order in the tribe’s territory, it is important
that tribal judges presiding in these cases also receive training in
the dynamics of this kind of violence, understand perpetrator
behavior, and how to meet victim/survivor needs.111 It is essential
108

Id. at Standard 301(a).
A Survey of Law School Curricula, A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. AND
ADMISSIONS 25 (2004).
110
Id. at 27.
111
25 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(2) (2010) (Domestic Violence):
109

[M]eans violence committed by a current or former spouse or
intimate partner of the victim, by a person with whom the
victim shares a child in common, by a person who is
cohabitating with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse
or intimate partner, or by a person similarly situated to a
spouse of the victim under the domestic or family violence
laws of an Indian tribe that has jurisdiction over the Indian
country where the violence occurs.
25 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(1) (2010) (Dating Violence):
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that tribal judges be given the tools to comply with Anglo notions
of due process while also meeting their own tribal criminal justice
goals (e.g., offender accountability, restorative justice, etc.).
Unfortunately, outside of the law school setting there are few
opportunities for non-attorney judges to access criminal law and
procedure training. A review of the courses offered by the National
Judicial College for 2015 reveals that there are a few that may
provide, in part at least, some of the training that a reviewing
federal judge would find sufficient: Essential Skills for Tribal
Court Judges; Advanced Tribal Bench Skills: Competence,
Confidence, and Control; Special Court Jurisdiction; and
Advanced Special Court Jurisdiction. 112 The Special Court
Jurisdiction courses are not tribal court specific, but tribal judges
may attend. Another course, “ICRA: Protecting Rights in Tribal
Court” was offered in 2014 but was not offered in 2015. Each of
these courses costs between $995 (and conference fee of $245) for
[M]eans violence committed by a person who is or has been in
a social relationship of a romantic or intimate nature with the
victim, as determined by the length of the relationship, the
type of relationship, and the frequency of interaction between
the persons involved in the relationship.
25 U.S.C. §§ 1304(5) (2010) (Protection Order):
(A) means any injunction, restraining order or other order
issued by a civil or criminal court for the purpose of
preventing violent or threatening acts or harassment against,
sexual violence against, contact or communication with, or
physical proximity to, another person; and
(B) includes any temporary or final order issued by a civil or
criminal court, whether obtained by filing an independent
action or as a pendent lite order in another proceeding, if the
civil or criminal order was issued in response to a complaint,
petition, or motion filed by or on behalf of a person seeking
protection.
112
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NATIONAL JUDICIAL COLLEGE, http://www.judges.org/special-court-jurisdiction1607/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2015) (emphasis added). Tribal judges charged with
exercising jurisdiction under TLOA, however, will also be handling felony
cases.
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a three day training and $1,595 (plus a conference fee of $495).113
Some scholarships are made available but the vast majority of
tribal judges must pay these fees out of pocket, plus the cost of
their travel to Reno, Nevada, lodging, and meals.114 There does not
appear to be one single course or a series of courses that can assure
that the tribal judge participant will be “sufficiently trained” to
handle TLOA and VAWA criminal cases. Given the fact that
VAWA 2013’s tribal jurisdictional provisions became effective for
all tribes in March 2015, it is urgent that training be developed to
meet this need without delay. It is imperative that tribal judges who
are familiar with U.S. Constitution-based Due Process protections
and the need to adhere to tribal values, such as restorative justice
principles, traditions, and customs deliver the training. Ideally
there should be a certificate that a tribal court judge can earn that
will provide prima facie evidence of “sufficient legal training” to
preside over criminal matters governed by 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302(c)
and 1304. Having retired federal judges provide advice on the
development of the course curriculum may bolster acceptance of
the certificate by the federal courts. The training should be
available year-round, not just offered on an ad hoc basis. Online
courses and webinars, available to even the most remote tribes
should be created. Given the practical outlook of many American
Indians and Alaska Natives, it is also important to incorporate
experiential learning methods. Santa Clara Pueblo member
Professor Gregory A. Cajeta observed that “many Indians have less
difficulty comprehending educational materials and approaches
that are concrete or experiential rather than abstract and theoretical.
Given this characteristic, learning and teaching should begin with
numerous concrete examples and activities to be followed by
discussion of the abstraction.” 115 Finally, ongoing continuing
judicial education should be developed and readily available to
keep tribal court judges current.
Now that the need for judicial education has been established,
the question arises: How will tribes pay for training? As discussed
113
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earlier, tribal courts are and have been historically underfunded.
Most tribal courts are supported with a combination of sources:
Bureau of Indian Affairs funding, grants from the Department of
Justice or other government agency, and tribal funds. The Bureau
of Indian Affairs Tribal Justice Support Directorate describes its
mission as follows:
Tribal Justice Support provides funding guidance,
technical support, and advisory services to tribal
courts and the Courts of Indian Offenses. This
includes providing funding to tribal courts, training
directed to specific needs of tribal court personnel,
promoting cooperation and coordination among
tribal justice systems and Federal and state judiciary
systems, and providing oversight for the continuing
operations for the Courts of Indian Offenses.116
The Office of Tribal Justice Support did offer some trial advocacy
training in 2013 and 2014, but no future planned trainings are
listed on their website. 117 TLOA established the Indian Law
Enforcement Foundation (“Foundation”) whose duties include:
‘‘assist[ing] the Office of Justice Services of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs and Indian tribal governments in funding and conducting
activities and providing education to advance and support the
provision of public safety and justice services in American Indian
and Alaska Native communities.”118 The Secretary of the Interior
should have established the Foundation no later than January 20,
2011, however, to this date, there is no evidence that the
Foundation exists.119
Under the U.S. Department of Justice Coordinated Tribal
Assistance Solicitation (CTAS), federally recognized tribes and
tribal consortia may apply for funding to improve public safety and
victim services in tribal communities.120 Applications may be filed
116
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under five different Purpose Areas. 121 Under Purpose Area 3,
Justice Systems and Alcohol and Substance Abuse, and Purpose
Area 5, Violence Against Women Tribal Governments Program, a
tribe may use funding “[t]o implement enhanced authorities and
provisions under the Tribal Law and Order Act and the Violence
Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013.”122 It appears that
training a tribal judge to preside over criminal proceedings would
fall under this provision. However, tribal judicial education
providers are not eligible to receive this funding directly to develop
and deliver the training.
The U.S. Department of Justice Office of Violence Against
Women Grants to Support Families in the Justice System program
(“Justice for Families Program”) was authorized by VAWA
2013. 123 The intent of the Justice for Families Program is to
improve the response of all aspects of the civil and criminal justice
system to families with a history of domestic violence, dating
violence, sexual assault, and stalking, or cases of child sexual
abuse allegations. 124 Among the eligible applicants are Indian
tribal governments, tribal courts and non-profit organizations
providing tribal judicial education. Under Purpose Area 3
“Training for court-based and court-related personnel” funding is
available to:
Educate court-based and court-related personnel
and court-appointed personnel (including custody
evaluators and guardians ad litem) and child
protective services workers on the dynamics of
domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault,
and stalking, including information on perpetrator
behavior, evidence-based risk factors for domestic
ANNOUNCEMENT (2015),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/tribal/pages/attachments/2014/11/19/ct
as_fy-2015_solicitation.pdf. The application deadline was February 24, 2015.
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and dating violence homicide, and on issues relating
to the needs of victims, including safety, security,
privacy, and confidentiality, including cases in
which the victim proceeds pro se.125
The Justice for Families Program funds can be used to develop and
deliver training to tribal court judges that will improve their
competence in handling SDVCJ cases beyond merely developing
an understanding of criminal law and procedure.
Section 402 of TLOA reauthorized the Tribal Justice Act, and
Indian Tribal Justice Technical and Legal Assistance Act of
2001.126 These Acts authorize funding for tribal court judges, court
personnel, public defenders, court facilities, and the development
of records managements systems and other needs of tribal court
systems. 127 The Tribal Justice Act, originally enacted December
1993, authorized the appropriation of $58.4 million in tribal court
base funding. 128 Yet, not a single dollar under the Tribal Justice
Act has been appropriated in the twenty-two years since its
passage.129 Of particular note is the provision of the Tribal Justice
Act that states that federal funds may be used specifically for
“training programs and continuing education for tribal judicial
personnel.” 130 The reauthorization of these Acts, which could
provide much-needed funds to support tribal court base operations
and enhancements, are set to expire in 2015. Appropriations should
finally be made to fulfill the promise of these Acts.

CONCLUSION
Tribes fought hard for the passage of TLOA and Title IX of
VAWA. Not all tribes may choose to avail themselves of the
enhanced sentencing authority or SDVCJ. Many tribes believe that
the imposition of federal standards of Due Process infringes on
tribal sovereignty and self-determination. There is resistance to
125
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being told who may and may not serve as a tribal judge in criminal
proceedings. However, the judicial qualification provisions were
one of the compromises that were reached in order for tribal
jurisdiction to be restored. Other tribes may not implement TLOA
or SDVCJ because they lack the funding to hire licensed judges or
to train their existing judges. Congress adopted a flexible standard
when it came to the licensure of tribal court judges. This standard
accommodates a tribe’s culturally responsive decision to authorize
non-law school graduates to serve as tribal court judges. The
requirement that a tribal court judge have “sufficient legal training
to preside over criminal proceedings” is less straightforward.
Realizing that tribal court convictions will be increasingly subject
to federal court review through habeas corpus proceedings, tribes
should endeavor to develop judicial standards and training that will
pass muster with a federal judge. Hopefully, it will be the tribal
court judges themselves who take the lead to develop and provide
the training that comports with federal expectations—while still
ensuring fidelity to indigenous tribal justice beliefs and practices.

